Public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) allows a cloud server to retrieve particular ciphertexts without leaking the contents of the searched ciphertexts. This kind of cryptographic primitive gives users a special way to retrieve the encrypted documents they need while preserving privacy. Nevertheless, most existing PEKS schemes only offer single-keyword search or conjunctive-keyword search. The poorly expressive ability and constantly inaccurate search results make them hard to meet users' requirements. Although several expressive PEKS (EPEKS) schemes were proposed, they entail high computation and communication costs. An ideal EPEKS scheme should enable fast and accurate ciphertext retrieval, while lowering the storage server's load and reducing the amount of communication data. Drawing on the strongly expressive ability of key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE), we propose a generic construction of EPEKS from KP-ABE. We demonstrate that the derived EPEKS scheme is secure under the chosen keyword attack if the implicit KP-ABE scheme fulfills the anonymity under the chosen plaintext attack. Furthermore, we present a concrete EPEKS scheme over the prime-order groups. The comparison and experimental results indicate that our scheme is more efficient than the existing EPEKS schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the prevalence of the Internet and the widespread application of cloud computing technology, personal privacy information often undergoes massive transmission via channels such as computer networks and public communication devices. These information transmission media are unsafe yet hardly replaceable. Asymmetric cryptosystem was developed to allow people to share secret information without transmitting decryption keys. But in some cases, people need to process the encrypted information. Imagining such a situation, a user uploads a large quantity of encrypted data files to an untrusted server. Later, the user wants to fetch back some certain files from the server. How could the server pick out the target documents from a large amount of ciphertexts?
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In another case, to protect personal privacy, a user sends encrypted mails to the email sever. How could the receiver of the mails tell which mails contain important contents that need urgent processing and which ones could be directly ignored? One primitive way is to download and decrypt all received emails, before being able to get the wanted information. But this will result in large communication and computation cost, hence very inefficient. To address the problem, the paradigm of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) [1] was invented. PEKS allows a message sender to create a searchable ciphertext by attaching a keyword ciphertext to the encrypted file. To execute ciphertext search, the recipient makes use of his/her private key to produce a trapdoor of the search keyword (or keywords) and then sends it to the server. The server can search the ciphertexts using the trapdoor and returns all matching files. In this process, no information (neither the contents of the searched VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ciphertexts nor the search keyword(s)) would be disclosed to the server. A data file may be associated with multiple keywords. However, a PEKS scheme only enables the server to retrieve documents that contain a certain keyword. These schemes can't meet the user's needs because the single keyword search often results in coarse search results. Users are more likely to use multiple keywords in their daily searches. Therefore, Boolean combination of search keywords is necessary to make data retrieval effective. In [2] , Park et al. proposed the first PEKS scheme that can execute multiple-keyword search, namely public key encryption with conjunctive keyword search (PECKS). PECKS enables recipients to seek encrypted files with more than one keyword. But, it can only support keyword conjunction, therefore does not have sufficient expressive power. If a user wants to get the documents marked by a keyword ''important'' or a keyword ''urgent'', he/she must search twice. To realize more expressive keyword search, Lai et al. [3] proposed the expressive PEKS (EPEKS) scheme that supports the logical expression of both ''AND'' and ''OR''. As illustrated in FIGURE 1, an EPEKS scheme includes three entities: the server, the sender and the receiver. The sender sends to the server ciphertexts attached with searchable encrypted labels. The searchable encrypted labels are associated with a keyword set. The receiver generates a trapdoor according to the logical expression of keywords (which, in FIGURE 1, is shown as a logic tree). When the server gets the trapdoor from the receiver, it runs a test algorithm and sends to the receiver particular ciphertexts that pass the test algorithm. In [3] , [4] , two EPEKS schemes were presented respectively but over the composite-order groups. These two schemes are unfriendly to PCs because in the composite-order groups, the elements are longer than elements in the prime-order groups and the computation cost is higher. How to build efficient EPEKS schemes over the prime-order groups with strong expressive ability remains a hotspot.
As is known to all, attribute-based encryption (ABE) has a very strong access control capability [5] . In ABE, attributes are usually administered by a single central trusted authority that awards private keys to users. Each user's private key contains information on user attributes. There are two types of ABE schemes: one is the key-policy ABE (KP-ABE), and the other is ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE). In a KP-ABE, an access structure (AS) is implanted in the private key and the ciphertext has a bearing on a set of attributes. Opposite to that in KP-ABE, an access structure in a CP-ABE is implanted in the ciphertext and the private key has a bearing on a set of attributes. FIGURE 2 shows the framework of KP-ABE. In a KP-ABE scheme, the trusted center uses a logical expression of attributes (which, in FIGURE 2, is shown as a logic tree) to generate an access structure. One sound way to construct an access structure is using a linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS). The ciphertext gets decrypted only when the access structure is met by the attribute set. An access structure built via LSSS could enable the KP-ABE scheme to realize access control in cases that the logical expressions of attributes contain ''AND'' and ''OR''. This paper proposes a generic construction of EPEKS from KP-ABE and gives an efficient EPEKS scheme over the prime-order groups.
A. RELATED WORKS
In [6] , Song came up with the concept of searchable encryption and exhibited a specific scheme under symmetric key system. Boneh et al. [1] gave the first PEKS scheme in 2004 and proposed a generic construction of PEKS from identity-based encryption (IBE). Since then, many scholars have proposed lots of improved PEKS schemes to enhance the scheme performance or security [7] - [20] .
To improve search accuracy when using search engines, users are more likely to search several keywords rather than a single keyword. Multi-keyword search is also needed for retrieving ciphertext. Golle et al. [21] constructed a searchable symmetric encryption scheme with conjunctive-keyword search. In the scheme, every document has several keyword domains and each keyword domain has a keyword to represent a feature. The communication cost changes linearly with the number of keyword domains and the feature representation is not flexible enough due to constraints by keyword domains. Park et al. [2] gave the first PEKS scheme supporting conjunctive-keyword search. Based on Park et al.'s works, further efforts were made to reduce computation cost and trapdoor size [22] - [25] .
EPEKS has attracted widespread concern in the domain of searchable encryption because of its strong search function. Lai et al. [3] put forward the first EPEKS scheme on the basis of a completely secure KP-ABE scheme [26] . Lai et al.'s scheme is established over the composite-order groups. Hence, its computation cost is high and the length of the ciphertext and that of the trapdoor are both linear to the keyword number. Lv et al. [4] proposed the first expressive PEKS scheme supporting ''AND'', ''OR'' and ''NOT''. This scheme is also over the composite-order groups and hence inefficient. In 2016, Cui et al. [27] embedded the LSSS structure into keyword search and, for the first time, implemented an EPEKS scheme over the prime-order groups. However, both the communication cost and the computation cost of the scheme remain high.
In 1984, Shamir published a paper to describe the concept of identity-based cryptography [28] . His core idea is to directly use some inherent identity information as users' public keys, while the private keys are distributed to users by a trusted third party. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin successfully constructed the first pragmatic identity-based encryption scheme which is provably secure [29] . Their scheme makes use of the bilinear mapping technology. In [30] , Sahai and Waters proposed a fuzzy identity-based encryption (FIBE) scheme which is regarded as the embryonic form of ABE. FIBE extends IBE by lablling each user with a set of idenities. In an FIBE scheme, a ciphertext could be decrypted only when intersection of the identity set for encryption and the identity set for decryption is greater than a threshold. But, the threshold access structure limits the scope of scheme application. In [31] , Goval et al. published a paper and exhibited the first KP-ABE scheme. This scheme is not applicable in large attribute universe environment because its public parameter is linear to the attribute number in the universe. Lewko and Waters [32] proposed the first large universe KP-ABE scheme but over the composite-order groups. Lemko [33] proposed a KP-ABE scheme in large universe and this scheme was constructed over the prime-order groups. By now, many efficient KP-ABE schemes have been given [34] - [37] . In [38] , Wang et al. gave an ABE scheme with keyword search. This scheme combines ABE with PEKS, and makes it possible that only users complying with the access control strategy could search the ciphertexts. In [39] , Zheng et al. designed a verifiable attribute-based keyword search scheme. This scheme could verify whether the server has performed retrieval operations as required, therefore supports the monitoring of malicious servers. In 2017, Li et al. also proposed schemes of this type [40] , [41] . In addition, Zhang et al. [42] and Jung et al. [43] respectively gave anonymous ABE schemes to protect the privacy of attributes.
B. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
This paper focuses on the efficient construction of EPEKS from KP-ABE. KP-ABE has strong access control capacity and efficient operation performance. In a KP-ABE scheme, every user is marked by an attribute set and only users with specific attributes are authorized to decrypt a specific ciphertext. Clearly, KP-ABE makes user screening possible. Implementing such a screening process on a cloud storage sever, users can only retrieve specific files, which is exactly what EPEKS could do. This inspires us to devise a generic transformation from KP-ABE to EPEKS.
In a KP-ABE scheme, a trusted center authority generates users' private keys according to the user attributes. If the user attributes are regarded as the search keywords, then the private key generation algorithm in the KP-ABE scheme could be used to generate the trapdoors of search keywords in the EPEKS scheme. Correspondingly, the keyword ciphertexts in EPEKS could be generated by using the KP-ABE encryption algorithm to encrypt a random message. The test algorithm in the EPEKS scheme could be executed by decrypting the random-message ciphertext and checking whether the decrypted message is the same as that in the original ciphertext. In so doing, the strong access control ability of KP-ABE on user screening could be inherited by the derived EPEKS scheme to screen files. However, such transformation is unsuitable to most existing KP-ABE schemes, because these schemes should attach an attribute set behind the generated ciphertext and thus don't provide any protection to the user attributes. Privacy protection of the keywords is a very important issue in the construction of EPEKS. Therefore, these KP-ABE schemes cannot be directly exploited to construct the EPEKS schemes.
To protect the privacy of attributes, some anonymous ABE schemes were proposed, e.g. [34] , [35] . This kind of schemes can be transformed to EPEKS directly, but they are quite inefficient. After a close examination of existing KP-ABE schemes, we find that most KP-ABE schemes could turn anonymous if the attribute sets get removed from the ciphertexts. But such removal makes the ciphertext decryption a challenging task, which also makes the test algorithm in the post-transformation EPEKS scheme ineffective. In [27] , Cui et al. provided a solution to this problem, which exposes the keyword attribute names while hiding the keyword values. For example, during the production of a ciphertext with a keyword set {''job = teacher'', ''gender = male''}, the attribute names (''job'', ''gender'') are attached to the ciphertext without displaying the keyword values. In this way, the privacy of keywords is preserved. Actually, in many practical retrieval systems, the search keywords are input in certain orders according to the attributes of the generic names. After inputting the search keywords, users could search for their expected documents accurately. In such context, the number and order of keywords are both pre-defined. Therefore, if the attributes (including the number and the order) of the keywords encrypted in ciphertexts are pre-defined, the keyword attribute names need not be attached to the ciphertexts.
In this paper, we provide a generic construction of EPEKS from anonymous KP-ABE. Then, a concrete EPEKS scheme is derived from an anonymous KP-ABE scheme to show the application of the generic construction. Below are the concrete contributions: 1) We present an efficiently generic EPEKS construction that provides a general way to build the EPEKS schemes from the anonymous KP-ABE schemes directly. The derived EPEKS scheme is indistinguishable secure against chosen keyword attacks if the underlying KP-ABE scheme fulfills anonymity against chosen plaintext attacks. We formally show the proving process. 2) We construct an efficient EPEKS scheme and formally prove that it achieves indistinguishability against chosen keyword attacks. As shown in Table 1 , our EPEKS scheme enjoys many merits. It is established over the prime-order groups so that it has significant advantages in performance over the EPEKS schemes over the composite-order groups [3] , [4] . The comparison and the experimental results show that it also outperforms Cui et al.'s scheme [27] which is the only EPEKS scheme over the prime-order groups before ours. Moreover, it supports unbounded keywords and expressive search by the logical expression ''AND'' and ''OR'' of the search keywords. 
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
Section II briefly lists some background notions and definitions. In section III, we give the generic construction from an anonymous KP-ABE scheme to an EPEKS scheme and then demonstrate its security. In the ensuing section IV, we propose an anonymous KP-ABE scheme over the prime-order groups and formally prove its security. Then we convert the proposed KP-ABE scheme into a concrete EPEKS scheme.
In Section V, we implement the derived EPEKS scheme and compare it with Cui et al.'s EPEKS scheme. In Section VI, we make a summary and present suggestions for further research efforts.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section reviews some essential background knowledge briefly.
A. BILINEAR MAP AND COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTION
Define G as a group of prime order p. A bilinear map e: G × G → G T between group G and group G T must be with properties as follows: 1) Bilinear: For all g ∈ G and all a,b ∈ Z p , e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab ;
2) Non-degenerate: e(g, g) = 1.
3) Computable: For any g 1 ,g 2 ∈ G, e(g 1 ,g 2 ) can be computed efficiently. The security of our proposed EPEKS scheme is on the basis of decisional (q -2) assumption [5] .
Definition 1: Define q as an integer and let there be a bilinear group environment (p, G, G T , e). The decisional (q-2) assumption is: given elements
in G, it is hard to differentiate e(g, g) xyz from a random element T in G T for any polynomial-time (PT) adversary.
Here g ∈ G and x, y, z, b 1 , . . . , b q are chosen randomly from Z p . The decisional (q-2) assumption declares that for any PT adversary A, the advantage Adv A in figuring out the decisional (q-2) problem is negligible. Here Adv A is defined to be
S denotes the set of given elements as shown above.
B. ACCESS STRUCTURE AND LINEAR SECRET SHARING SCHEME
We describe the concepts of access structure and linear secret sharing technique following the definitions in [5] .
Definition 2: Define U as the attribute universe. An access structure AS on U is a collection of nonempty attribute sets, i.e. AS ⊆ 2 U /{∅}. The sets in AS are named the authorized sets and the sets not in AS are named the unauthorized sets.
If an access structure satisfies that C ∈ AS can be deduced from ∀B, C ∈AS and B ⊆ C, this access structure is monotone.
Definition 3: Define p as a prime and U as the universe of attributes. A secret-sharing scheme with domain of secrets Z p realizing access structures on U is linear over Z p if: 1) For each attribute form a vector over Z p , the shares of a secret s ∈ Z p . 2) For each access structure AS on U , there is a sharegenerating matrix MA ∈ Z l×n p . 3) There exists a mapping ρ, that connects each row of MA with an attribute from U , i.e. ρ ∈ F([l] → U ), which conform to the following rules: In the course of the construction of the shares, we construct the column vector v = (s,r 2 , . . . , r n ) ⊥ , where r 2 , . . . , r n ∈ R Z p . Then the vector of l shares of the secret s is equal to
The pair (MA, ρ) is the policy of the access structure AS.
C. ANONYMOUS KP-ABE AND SECURITY DEFINITION
A KP-ABE scheme is formed by four algorithms:
1) Setup(f ). This algorithm is executed by a trusted central authority (TCA) and requires a security parameter f as input. It generates the public parameters PP and a master key MK. MK is maintained secret by the TCA and the PP are made public. 2) KeyGen(PP, MK, AS). This algorithm is executed by the TCA and requires PP, MK, and an access structure AS as input. It generates a private key SK AS according to the access structure AS. 3) Encrypt (PP, M , ATS) . This algorithm is executed by the sender and requires PP, a message M and an attribute set ATS as input. It generates a ciphertext CT ATS and outputs it. Only users with access structure AS that is met by ATS can decrypt CT ATS . 4) Decrypt(PP, SK AS , CT ATS ). This algorithm is executed by the receiver and demands PP, SK AS and CT ATS as input. It outputs a message M if the attribute set ATS corresponding to the ciphertext CT ATS meets the access structure AS embedded in SK AS . Otherwise, the algorithm will fail. The following adversarial game defines the security of an anonymous KP-ABE scheme [34] . This game is carried out between an adversary A and a challenger Ch:
1) Init. A declares two challenge attribute sets ATS 0 , ATS 1 with the same length. 
D. EPEKS AND SECURITY DEFINITION
An EPEKS scheme is formed by four randomized algorithms below:
1) KeyGen(f ). This algorithm is performed by the receiver and requires a security parameter f as input. It outputs user's public key PK and private key SK. 2) Trapdoor(PK, SK, P). This algorithm is executed by the receiver and requires PK,SK and a search predicate P as input. It generates T P as the trapdoor of the predicate P. 3) Encrypt(PK, WS). This algorithm is executed by the sender and requires PK and a keyword set WS as input.
It produces a searchable encryption SE WS of the keyword set WS. 4) Test(PK, T P , SE WS ). This algorithm is executed by the server and requires PK, T P and SE WS as input. It outputs 1 if the keyword set WS corresponding to the searchable encryption SE WS meets the predicate P embedded in trapdoor T P or 0 otherwise. An EPEKS scheme should not leak any information about the WS encoded in SE WS . It should guarantee that the adversary can't distinguish two encryptions of WS 0 and WS 1 as long as the adversary has never gained the corresponding trapdoor. In this paper, we adopt the security model provided by Cui et al. [27] , where the security of an EPEKS scheme is defined through the following adversarial game:
1) Init. The adversary A declares two challenge keyword sets WS 0 , WS 1 with the same length. 
III. FROM KP-ABE TO EPEKS
In this section, we propose a generic construction of EPEKS from anonymous KP-ABE and demonstrate its security. Then, the adversary B sends b to Ch as its guess in the ANO-IND-CPA game. According to the above simulation, we clearly have that the adversaries A and B have the same success probability in guessing b. Therefore, if A can break the IND-CKA security of the scheme EPEKS with advantage ε, then the adversary B can break the ANO-IND-CPA security of the scheme KP-ABE with the same advantage.
This proves Theorem 1.
IV. A CONCRETE EPEKS SCHEME
In this section, we first propose an efficient KP-ABE scheme and demonstrate it to be ANO-IND-CPA secure. Then, we transform the proposed KP-ABE scheme into an EPEKS scheme by using the generic construction presented above.
A. AN ANONYMOUS KP-ABE SCHEME
The proposed anonymous KP-ABE scheme is constructed as follows: 1) Setup(f ). This algorithm is executed by the TCA and requires inputting a security parameter f . It generates a bilinear group (G, G T ) of prime order p and a bilinear map e: G × G→ G T . Then it picks a random generator g ∈ G and three random elements u,h, w ∈ G and a random number α ∈ Z p . Finally, it outputs the public parameters PP= (p, G, G T , e, g, u,h, w, e(g, g) α ) and maintains the master key MK= α secret. 2) KenGen(PP, MK, AS). This algorithm is executed by the TCA. It first picks a vector y = (α, y 2 ,. . . , y n ) ⊥ where y 2 ,. . . , y n ∈ Z p . Then it computes λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 ,. . . , λ l ) ⊥ = MA y, where MA is the share-generating matrix in the access structure AS. After this, it picks l random numbers t 1 , t 2 ,. . . , t l ∈ Z p . For every τ ∈ [l], it calculates K τ,0 = g λ τ w t τ , K τ,1 = u ρ(τ ) h −t τ and K τ,2 = g t τ . Finally, it outputs the private key SK AS = (MA, {K τ,0 , K τ,1 , K τ,2 } τ ∈[l] ). 3) Encrypt(PP, M , ATS). This algorithm is executed by the sender. It chooses k+1 random numbers s,r 1 , r 2 ,. . . ,r k ∈ Z p , calculates C = M · e(g, g) αs , C 0 = g s , and for every τ ∈ [k] it computes C τ,1 = g r τ and
Finally, it generates the ciphertext CT ATS = (C, C 0 , {C τ,1 ,C τ,2 } τ ∈[k] ). 4) Decrypt(PP, SK AS , CT ATS ). This algorithm is executed by the server. Let I AS be the minimum subset meeting AS. The sever calculates I AS from the access structure MA and checks whether there is an I∈I AS satisfying M = C i∈I e C 0 , K i,0 e C τ,1 , K i,1 e C τ,2 , K i,2
where {ω i ∈ Z p } i∈I . Note that i∈I ω i MA i = (1, 0,. . . , 0) where MA i is the i th row of the matrix MA. It outputs ⊥ if no element in I AS satisfies the above equation or M otherwise.
Correctness: If the attribute set ATS is authorized, then we have the equation i∈I ω i λ i = α.According to the above description, we have i∈I e C 0 , K i,0 e C τ,1 , K i,1 e C τ,2 , K i,2
Therefore, the proposed scheme is correct.
B. SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED KP-ABE SCHEME Theorem 2: If the q-2 decisional assumption holds, then the proposed KP-ABE scheme conforms to the ANO-IND-CPA security in the standard model.
Proof: If there is a PT adversary A who can break the ANO-IND-CPA security of the proposed KP-ABE scheme with a non-negligible advantage ε, then we can build an algorithm B to solve the decisional (q-2) problem with a nonnegligible advantage ε.
Assuming that the algorithm B gets a random instance of the decisional (q-2) problem
where g ∈ G, x, y, z, b 1 , . . . , b q ∈ Z * p and T ∈ G T . The aim of the algorithm B is to ascertain that whether T = e(g, g) xyz . To do so, the algorithm B simulates the challenger of the ANO-IND-CPA game and interacts with A as follows.
1) Init. The adversary A gives the algorithm B two attribute sets ATS 0 and ATS 1 . We assume that both ATS 0 and ATS 1 include k (k ≤ q) different attributes. 2) Setup. The algorithm B randomly chooses β ∈ {0, 1}.
It then picks two random integersũ,h ∈ Z p and sets
i and e(g, g) α = e(g x , g y ). Finally, it outputs PP= (p, G, G T , e, g, u,h, w, e(g, g) α ) as the PP to the adversary A. Here the master key is set as α = xy implicitly which is not known to the algorithm B.
3) Phase 1. In this phase, the algorithm B is required to create a private key for each access structure (MA, ρ) queried by the adversary A. The restriction is that the access structure is not met by either ATS 0 or ATS 1 .
Since ATS β is not authorized by (MA, ρ), there exists a vector ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω n ) ⊥ ∈ Z n p such that ω 1 = 1 and MA i · ω = 0 for all (i ∈ [l], ρ(i) ∈ATS β ). The vector y that will be shared is y = xy ω + (0, y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ) ⊥ (this vector is set implicitly), where y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n are random elements in Z p . For each row τ ∈ [l], the share is λ τ = MA τ · y = xy(MA τ · ω)+ (MA τ · (0, y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ) ⊥ ) = xy(MA τ · ω) + λ τ . For each row in MA, if ρ(τ ) ∈ ATS β , then MA τ · ω = 0. In this case λ τ = λ τ , the algorithm B selects a random element t τ ∈ Z p and outputs K τ,0 , K τ,1 , K τ,2 as in the algorithm KeyGen.
In another case, if ρ(τ ) / ∈ ATS β , the algorithm B selects a random element t τ ∈ Z p and implicitly sets
Then, it produces a private key in the following way: 
Finally, the algorithm B sends CT ATS = (C, C 0 , {C τ,1 , C τ,2 } τ ∈[k] ) to A as a challenge ciphertext. 5) Phase 2. Proceed as in Phase 1.
6) Guess.
A outputs its answer β for β. If β = β, the algorithm B outputs 1 which means that T is equal to e(g, g) xyz . Otherwise, it outputs 0. If T = e(g, g) xyz , the algorithm B provides a legal challenge ciphertext to A. Therefore, Pr[β = β] = 1/2 ± ε. Otherwise, the ciphertext is invalid and thus Pr[β = β] = 1/2. Therefore, the advantage of the algorithm B in dealing with the given decisional (q-2) problem is |1/2 ±ε -1/2| = ε.
This proves Theorem 2.
C. AN EFFICIENT EPEKS SCHEME Based on the above anonymous KP-ABE scheme, an EPEKS scheme can be derived as follows: 1) KeyGen(f ). This algorithm generates the environment including bilinear groups (G, G T ) of prime order p and a bilinear map e: G × G→ G T . Then it picks a random generator g ∈ G, three random elements u,h, w ∈ G and a random number α ∈ Z p . Finally, it outputs PK= (p, G, G T , e, g, u,h, w, e(g, g) α ) and SK= α. 2) Trapdoor(PK, SK, P). This algorithm is executed by the receiver. It first generates an access structure AS from P. Then it picks a vector y = (α, y 2 , . . . , y n ) ⊥ where y 2 , . . . , y n ∈ Z p and computes λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ l ) ⊥ =MA y, where MA is the share-generating matrix in the access structure AS. Finally, it picks l random numbers (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t l ) ∈ Z p and computes K τ,0 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare our EPEKS scheme with Cui et al.'s scheme [27] in the aspects of the computation cost and the communication cost. Considering that the EPEKS schemes in [3, 4] are over the composite-order groups and hence inefficient, we do not involve them into the comparison.
A. COMPARISON
Let l be the row number of the matrix in AS, k be the number of keywords encrypted in a ciphertext, |MA| be the size of an access structure, |G| be the element length in the group G, |G T | be the element length in the group G T , Ex be an exponentiation computation, Pa be a pairing computation, X 1 be the of element number in I M,ρ = {I 1 , . . . ,I X 1 } (the number of authorized sets), X 2 be |I 1 | + . . . + |I X 1 | and X 3 be the number of keywords in a search predicate. The computation cost and the communication cost of the compared schemes are respectively shown in 
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We test two schemes on a Lenovo L440 Laptop equipped with Intel Core i7 CPU (2.3GHz) and 8GB RAM. Our operate system is Win 7 (64 bit). The PBC (Pairing-Based Cryptography)-0.5.14 library [44] is installed for cryptographic operation. The bilinear map is established on Type A pairing over the elliptic curve with 512-bit group size. FIGURE 3, 4, 5 and 6 show the experimental results. We randomly choose 2-10 keywords to generate a predicate P and get trapdoor from the P. Actually, the number of keywords in a searching query is no more than 10 in practical application. As shown in FIGURE 3, Trapdoor generation for 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 keywords in our scheme costs about 32.485ms, 59.693ms, 83.046ms, 125.338ms and 178.189ms, respectively, while that in scheme [27] is about 93.265ms, 179.731ms, 258.124ms, 349.251ms and 452.572ms, respectively. To check the time cost of the encryption algorithm, we generate different random keyword sets containing 10-50 keywords to generate the ciphertexts. As shown in FIGURE 4, our scheme costs about half of the time required by Cui et al.'s scheme [27] . The computation cost of Test algorithm is related to predicate P and the keywords used to generate SE WS . The computation time will increase as the number of keywords in both the trapdoor and the ciphertext increases. The experimental results of two compared schemes are respectively given in FIGURE 5 and 6.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT
In this paper, we propose a new generic construction of EPEKS from anonymous KP-ABE and formally prove its security. An efficient concrete EPEKS scheme over the prime-order groups is given and its performance is analyzed. Yet, the EPEKS proposed in this paper only supports the logical expression of ''AND'' and ''OR'', excluding ''NOT''. And existing schemes that support the logical expression of ''AND'', ''OR'' and ''NOT'' are all based on composite-order VOLUME 8, 2020 groups, hence not quite efficient. Therefore, to propose an efficient EPEKS scheme over the prime-order groups that supports the ''AND'', ''OR'' and ''NOT'' operations of search keywords deserves further research efforts. His research interests include cryptography and information security, cloud computing, wireless security, and trusted computing. He has published more than 150 research articles in refereed international conferences and journals. His work has been cited more than 3000 times at Google Scholar. He has served as a Program Committee Member in more than 20 international conferences and served as a Reviewer in more than 90 international journals and conferences. VOLUME 8, 2020 
